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INTRODUCTION 
It is a false narrative that school segregation only exists in southern 
states.1 In fact, New York City (“NYC”) is one of the most segregated 
school districts in America.2 NYC public schools have failed—and still 
fail—to provide Black and Latinx3 students with the same resources and 
opportunities as white students.4 These racial disparities have persisted in 
NYC for as long as the South has dealt with federally mandated desegre-
gation.5 In the late 1950s, while the federal government tried to enforce 
the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education6 decision in Southern 
schools, white families in NYC actively fought against a citywide inte-
gration plan.7 
 
 1 E.g., Rebecca Klein, The South Isn’t the Reason Schools Are Still Segregated, New 
York Is, HUFFPOST (Apr. 1, 2016, 5:05 AM), https://perma.cc/MK8X-AF5U. 
 2 JOHN KUCSERA & GARY ORFIELD, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, NEW YORK STATE’S 
EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED FUTURE, at vi 
(2014), https://perma.cc/6U37-BEVB. 
 3 This Note uses the term “Latinx” to encompass folks who have been described as La-
tino and/or Hispanic as a way to recognize both a gender-neutral and an anti-Spanish coloni-
alist depiction of people who are from Latin America and/or speak Spanish, unless a source 
specifically uses a different term. For more information, see Yara Simón, Hispanic vs. Latino 
vs. Latinx: A Brief History of How These Words Originated, REMEZCLA: CULTURE (Sept. 
14, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://perma.cc/AA4G-GYMU and Terry Blas, I’m Latino. I’m His-
panic. And They’re Different, So I Drew a Comic to Explain., VOX, https://perma.cc/J8GC-
QWR6 (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 8:42 AM). 
 4 KUCSERA, supra note 2, at 24, 29. 
 5 See MICHAEL F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL 
RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 29-30 (2016); Klein, supra note 1. 
 6 Brown v. Board of Education was a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
However, schools did not integrate immediately after this decision. Instead, it took legislative 
interventions from Congress to galvanize the process. See Ian Millhiser, ‘Brown v. Board of 
Education’ Didn’t End Segregation, Big Government Did, NATION (May 14, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/V3G2-3BMU (explaining that Southern lawyers used the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 to challenge schools that refused to integrate). 
 7 See, e.g., DELMONT, supra note 5, at 32-34; Nikole Hannah-Jones, Choosing a School 
for My Daughter in a Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 9, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/6A4D-T362; Yasmeen Khan, Demand for School Integration Leads to Mas-
sive 1964 Boycott — in New York City, WNYC (Feb. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/W7CJ-DV4W; 
Christina Veiga, New York City Students Share Why They’re Fighting for School Integration, 
CHALKBEAT (Dec. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/3SFX-ZRP6. See generally Southern Mani-
festo, 102 CONG. REC. 4459 (1956). The NYC Board of Education formed the Commission 
on Integration in 1955 to create an integration plan in compliance with the Supreme Court’s 
order in Brown I. Khan, supra. The integration plan sought to rezone a small percentage of 
schools to prevent overcrowding and to improve the quality of education for predominantly 
Black and Latinx schools. Id. 
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School segregation has worsened in the last twenty years.8 Schools 
have resegregated in the South and have stayed segregated in the North.9 
In fact, the number of segregated schools nationwide nearly doubled be-
tween 1996 and 2016.10 As of 2014, more than one-third of Black students 
in the South attend an “intensely segregated” (ninety to one hundred per-
cent minority) school.11 The most segregated school systems, however, 
are in the North. In 2010, close to seventy-five percent of Black students 
attended a school in NYC where less than ten percent of their peers were 
white.12 Northern urban districts, which never officially enforced school 
segregation, have maintained dual systems of education through decades 
of redlining and strategic and exclusionary zoning.13 School districts in 
NYC, Newark, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. are made up of a ma-
jority of minority and low-income students and are heavily segregated.14 
Half of NYC’s schools are at least ninety percent Black or Latinx,15 while 
Black and Latinx students comprise only about sixty-seven percent of the 
City’s public school population.16 
 
 8 See Will Stancil, School Segregation Is Not a Myth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/AK6C-CD6S. See generally GARY ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
(2014), https://perma.cc/679R-L7KV (providing a statistical analysis to demonstrate that seg-
regation has substantially increased in school districts and offering recommendations to ad-
here to the promise articulated in Brown). 
 9 See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT & CTR. FOR EDUC. 
& CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: MORE THAN A HALF-CENTURY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 7-8 (2017), https://perma.cc/T9XZ-A89G; Mimi Kirk, Southern Schools Are Re-
segregating, CITYLAB (May 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZA9A-CCT3. 
 10 Stancil, supra note 8 (defining a segregated school as a school where less than forty 
percent of students are white); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, K-12 
EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND 
ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2016), https://perma.cc/CVT8-YAJW (“From school 
years 2000-01 to 2013-14 . . . the percentage of all K-12 public schools that had high percent-
ages of poor and Black or Hispanic students grew from nine to sixteen percent . . . .”). 
 11 ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 8. 
 12 See JOHN KUCSERA, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, New York Metro, Summary in NEW 
YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED 
FUTURE 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/8VXM-CUES. 
 13 Emily Lieb, How Segregated Schools Built Segregated Cities, CITYLAB (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/94PD-P9FC; Abel McDaniels, A New Path for School Integration, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 19, 2017 9:01 AM), https://perma.cc/8352-5EHE. 
 14 Alvin Chang, We Can Draw School Zones to Make Classrooms Less Segregated. This 
Is How Well Your District Does., VOX, https://perma.cc/WD58-FHHE (last updated Aug. 27, 
2018, 8:46 AM) (providing graphs that illustrate demographics of school attendance zones in 
major cities). 
 15 Yasmeen Khan & Beth Fertig, School Integration 2.0: How Could New York City Do 
It Better?, WNYC (June 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/U6GQ-EQJL. 
 16 NICOLE MADER & ANA CARLA SANT’ANNA COSTA, THE NEW SCH., CTR. FOR N.Y.C. 
AFFAIRS, NO HEAVY LIFTING REQUIRED: NEW YORK CITY’S UNAMBITIOUS SCHOOL 
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School segregation perpetuates white supremacy, a mechanism that 
ensures white students are afforded better teachers, facilities, and oppor-
tunities than Black and Latinx students.17 Research clearly shows that in-
tegrated schools positively impact all students regardless of their race.18 
Students who attend racially diverse schools have smaller test score gaps 
and develop enhanced critical thinking, problem-solving skills, and crea-
tivity from working with peers who have different experiences from their 
own.19 It is for these reasons that students, parents, and activists have 
fought and are fighting to change school policies, in an effort to improve 
the current academic reality for Black and Latinx students. 
While this article focuses on litigation as a way to address educa-
tional inequality in NYC public schools, litigation is only one tool in a 
broader effort to remedy the impact of segregation. In order to integrate 
NYC public schools, the students and families most impacted by segre-
gation must organize their communities, local politicians must enact re-
sponsive local legislation, and privileged parents must shift their views of 
public education.20 
Litigation has been used successfully to challenge segregation since 
the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education.21 Those nega-
tively impacted by school segregation, however, must be the ones who 
push for a lawsuit to address the ramifications of segregated schools, in 
order to ensure their needs are met and their desired outcomes are 
 
‘DIVERSITY’ PLAN (2018), https://perma.cc/5R6R-HFRU; NYC Public Schools at a Glance, 
N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, https://data.nysed.gov/profile.php?instid=7889678368 [https://perma.
cc/XE58-D2QR] (last visited May 9, 2019). 
 17 See Madina Toure, NYC Has the Most Segregated Schools in the Country. How Do We 
Fix That?, OBSERVER (June 14, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://perma.cc/GZ2T-4TBE (highlighting 
that NYC public schools have always been segregated due to white resistance and backlash); 
Veiga, supra note 7. 
 18 See AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., THE CENTURY FOUND., HOW RACIALLY DIVERSE 
SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CAN BENEFIT ALL STUDENTS 11-15 (2016), https://perma.
cc/3EUV-CPEQ (discussing the benefits of children attending diverse schools, including clos-
ing the “achievement gap,” positive learning outcomes, and an increased interracial under-
standing of other students). 
 19 Id. at 14. 
 20 See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 67-68 (1992); Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE. L.J. 470, 512 
(1976). I developed this understanding, and the need for community organizing, in my expe-
rience as a former educator in NYC public schools. 
 21 See Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Districts Still Face Fights—and Confusion—on In-
tegration, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/X9C3-RHBM (“The pace of the change 
brought by the federal courts was breathtaking. In 1963, about [one] percent of [B]lack chil-
dren in the South attended school with white children. By the early 1970s . . . [ninety] percent 
of [B]lack children attended desegregated schools.”). 
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reached.22 In NYC, it is Black and Latinx students who decide whether to 
initiate a lawsuit to challenge their school system’s failure to provide them 
with equal opportunities and resources to their white counterparts. It is 
incumbent on attorneys who represent students in desegregation litigation 
to make decisions that are driven by the desired outcomes of the commu-
nity they serve. For example, the Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”)23 has been 
successful in obtaining court orders that require districts to comply with 
the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.24 However, in the aftermath 
of Brown, a central critique of this strategy is that civil rights attorneys 
have considered the desires of and the litigation’s impact on “constitu-
ents,” who may have had a disconnected interest in the outcome of the 
lawsuit but had more access to civil rights lawyers to address school seg-
regation, rather than the desires of and impact on “clients,” whom their 
lawsuits purportedly served.25 In addition to meeting their burden of proof 
in court, lawyers must stay rooted in understanding and advocating for 
the needs of students and families in segregated communities. 
The options for challenging school segregation in federal courts, 
however, are limited, particularly in Northern school districts like NYC. 
According to the standard set by the Supreme Court, NYC public schools 
have never experienced de jure—intentional or “by law”—segregation.26 
Instead, “school officials, politicians, and parents” who are against deseg-
regation speak about segregation in NYC schools in such a way that it is 
“innocent, natural, and lawful.”27 While school segregation is in part a 
 
 22 See Bell, supra note 20, at 471-72 (“[Civil rights lawyers] have not waivered in their 
determination to implement Brown using racial balance developed in the hard-fought legal 
battles of the last two decades . . . . Now that traditional racial balance remedies are becoming 
increasingly difficult to achieve or maintain, there is tardy concern that racial balance may not 
be the relief actually desired by the victims of segregated schools,” whose “educational inter-
ests may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their attorneys.”). 
 23 For more information about the LDF, see Our Mission, LDF, https://perma.cc/JKB9-
C6JT (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 24 See Desegregation Cases / Issues, LDF, https://perma.cc/QJM6-FL92 (last visited June 
1, 2019). 
 25 Ronald Edmonds provides an example of this dynamic: low-income Black students 
may be the particular clients in a class action desegregation lawsuit, but the constituents are 
white and middle-class Blacks who drive the lawsuit forward with more access to civil rights 
attorneys and often “categorically oppose[] majority Black schools.” Ronald R. Edmonds, Ad-
vocating Inequity: A Critique of the Civil Rights Attorney in Class Action Desegregation Suits, 
3 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 176, 178-79 (1974); see also Bell, supra note 20, at 490-91 (discussing 
the problem—articulated by Edmonds—that civil rights attorneys face when white supporters, 
who contribute financially to a civil rights organization, do not share the same social outlook 
as the client, who is typically from a majority-Black school district). 
 26 “We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called 
de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 
189, 208 (1973). 
 27 DELMONT, supra note 5, at 32. 
2019] STILL SEPARATE, STILL UNEQUAL 309 
result of housing segregation caused by state action, in the eyes of the 
judicial system, school segregation in New York exists “by fact” and 
without action by the state.28 In 1974, the Supreme Court made clear that, 
in order to successfully challenge a school district for school segregation, 
state action must be the cause of that segregation.29 For this reason, as an 
alternative to challenging school segregation in federal courts, advocates 
and plaintiffs have used school finance litigation in state courts across the 
country, including in New York, to address the unequal funding schemes 
that are permissible under state constitutions and that, in turn, negatively 
impact schools with high concentrations of low-income students and high 
percentages of minority students.30 Unfortunately, school finance litiga-
tion has not been a successful tool for plaintiffs in New York, as the New 
York Court of Appeals has interpreted Article XI of the New York State 
Constitution, the State’s Education Article, only to require public schools 
to provide a low standard of education quality.31 
Due to the New York Court of Appeals’ articulation that schools only 
need to provide a minimum standard of education quality to its students 
under the Education Article, challenges brought under the New York 
State Constitution are unlikely to be successful. Thus, advocates must be 
creative. This Note demonstrates how the NYC Human Rights Law 
(“NYCHRL”), a powerful civil rights act, can be used to address racial 
segregation in NYC public schools and to fight for equality, since the New 
York Court of Appeals has blocked all other judicial avenues for relief.32 
Combined with ongoing grassroots and legislative advocacy, the 
NYCHRL can be utilized to effectively address school inequality and in-
tegrate NYC public schools. Litigation is a tool to be used in conjunction 
 
 28 The Supreme Court has issued rulings that essentially only allow challenges under the 
Constitution for de jure, not de facto, segregation in federal court cases. See infra Section II.A. 
“De jure” means according to law; “de facto” means existing in fact. De Jure, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); De Facto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Richard 
Rothstein has described the idea that neighborhoods are de facto segregated as a “myth.” Rich-
ard Rothstein, The Reason America’s Schools Are So Segregated – and the Only Way To Fix 
It, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/F4PK-LYFT. For a deeper analysis of the 
close relationship between state action and residential segregation in America, see RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 215-17 (2017) (“Residential segregation was created by state 
action . . . . If school boards had not placed schools and drawn attendance boundaries to ensure 
the separation of black and white pupils, families might not have had to relocate to have access 
to education for their children.”) (emphasis in original). 
 29 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (“[I]t must be shown that racially dis-
criminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district[,] have been 
a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.”) 
 30 James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
529, 537 (1999). 
 31 See infra Sections III.B and IV.B. 
 32 See infra Sections III.B and IV.B. 
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with organizing to address school segregation because, as stated by Louis 
Menand of the New Yorker, “[d]e-facto discrimination—we now call it 
‘institutional racism’ or ‘structural racism’—is much harder to address. It 
requires more of people than just striking down a law.”33 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the foundation of deseg-
regation litigation in federal courts. Part II briefly outlines the process for 
desegregation litigation in federal court and explains why federal litiga-
tion is not a viable option for plaintiffs in NYC. Part III discusses school 
finance litigation strategies in New York and other states. Part IV then 
examines litigation in Minnesota that has sought to persuade courts to 
read in an anti-segregation mandate into the state constitution and outlines 
how the New York Court of Appeals has instead interpreted the Education 
Article as holding schools to a weak standard. Part V focuses on the 
NYCHRL and argues that it provides plaintiffs with a creative avenue to 
seek relief for educational inequity by examining current litigation chal-
lenging unequal sports access for high school students in NYC. Finally, 
Part VI discusses how grassroots movements are persistently organizing 
to integrate the NYC public school system and provides suggestions for 
future litigation under the NYCHRL. 
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DESEGREGATION LITIGATION 
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court issued its decision on Brown 
v. Board of Education (Brown I), which struck down the “separate but 
equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson.34 Brown I consolidated 
four cases, with students and parents from school districts in Kansas, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware as plaintiffs, represented by the 
LDF.35 In this monumental decision, the Supreme Court abolished state-
sponsored segregation in public schools across United States by ruling 
that school segregation deprived the plaintiffs of equal protection of the 
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.36 
If only it were that simple. In Brown I, the Supreme Court did not 
order school districts to desegregate.37 Instead, one year after the Brown 
I decision, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of school segregation 
in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), which ordered school districts 
 
 33 Louis Menand, The Supreme Court Case that Enshrined White Supremacy in Law, 
NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/YM9P-T9DA. 
 34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (overruling Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 35 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1; Case: Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education, LDF, 
https://perma.cc/8SYQ-HQVN (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
 36 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 37 See id. 
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to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”38 This vague phrase allowed 
segregationists to continue delaying integration for years.39 After Brown 
II, plaintiffs spurred lawsuits in federal district courts across the country, 
asking courts to issue orders forcing segregated school districts to inte-
grate.40 As a result, courts issued orders mandating that states establish 
concrete integration plans, which included “busing, facilities upgrades, 
and compliance monitoring.”41 The impact on schools was drastic: in 
1963, “[one] percent of black children in the South attended school with 
white children. By the early 1970s . . . [ninety] percent of Black children 
attended desegregated schools.”42 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s precedent after Brown I and 
Brown II has not made the battle to integrate schools easier for students 
and families. After forcing school districts with de jure segregation to in-
tegrate their public schools, the Supreme Court began to chip away at 
families’ capacity to hold school districts and government actors account-
able for allowing segregation in other schools to continue. In 1974, in 
Milliken v. Bradley, the Court held that a federal district court may not 
impose a multidistrict remedy for “a single-district de jure segregation 
problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have 
failed to operate unitary school systems within their districts.”43 Milliken 
affected urban school districts’ ability to desegregate their schools 
 
 38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). See Arthur E. Suther-
land, Segregation by Race in Public Schools Retrospect and Prospect, 20 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 169 n.1 (1955), for a discussion of states that had de jure segregation at the time Brown 
II was decided. 
 39 This delay manifested itself in racist violence. For example, in 1957, Governor Orval 
Faubus of Arkansas called on the state’s National Guard to forcibly prevent Black students 
from integrating Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Only after President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower deployed federal troops were the Black students able to enter the school as 
angry protesters harassed them. Richard Kreitner, September 4, 1958: Arkansas Governor 
Calls Out the National Guard to Prevent Public School Integration, NATION (Sept. 4, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/E5QH-HPGU; David Smith, Little Rock Nine: The Day Young Students Shat-
tered Racial Segregation, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/X6WD-
BS9V. 
 40 See generally Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since 
Brown v. Board of Education, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10-49 (1975) (providing a discussion 
of the implementation of the Brown I mandate by federal courts). 
 41 COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., DESEGREGATION 
LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW 1, https://perma.cc/RG53-NU9K (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 42 Hannah-Jones, supra note 21. 
 43 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721 (1974). In Milliken, the Court highlighted that 
the evidence only demonstrated a de jure segregation problem in the Detroit school district, 
rather than a constitutional violation in any of the fifty-three outlying school districts or an 
interdistrict violation thereof. Id. at 745. Further, urban school districts like Detroit could not 
set aside arbitrary district lines on the basis of race. Id. at 745. 
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through the use of busing measures44 involving white suburban districts.45 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was one of the counsel for plaintiffs in 
Brown I, dissented in Milliken, stating that the Court had taken a “giant 
step backward” in the fight to integrate public schools.46 Further contex-
tualizing the negative impact of Milliken, Michael F. Delmont describes 
the decision in Milliken as “plac[ing] a nearly impossible burden of proof 
on those seeking school desegregation across city and suburban lines by 
requiring evidence of deliberate segregation across multiple school dis-
tricts.”47 Robert A. Sedler additionally observes that, after Milliken, “[t]he 
substantive right that has emerged is not a right to attend a racially inte-
grated school, but only a right to attend school in a school system in which 
there are no vestiges of de jure segregation.”48 
Then, in the 1990s, a series of cases curtailed a plaintiff’s power to 
challenge de facto school segregation,49 by making “it easier for [school] 
districts to be released from court oversight.”50 These cases increased the 
rate at which school districts were released from court supervision, as 
“more than twice as many districts were released [from judicial supervi-
sion] in the 2000s as in the 1990s.”51 By 2007, 193 of 480 Southern school 
 
 44 Busing was one tactic used to desegregate public schools by transporting primarily 
Black students into white districts. Michael F. Delmont describes the white parents’ uproar 
against “busing” in his book and corresponding website. DELMONT, supra note 5, at 3 (“De-
scribing opposition to “busing” as something other than resistance to school desegregation 
was a choice that obscured the histories of racial discrimination and legal contexts for deseg-
regation orders.”). 
 45 See Robert A. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 
1693, 1695-96 (1987). 
 46 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 47 DELMONT, supra note 5, at 17. 
 48 Sedler, supra note 45, at 1694,-95. 
 49 Hannah-Jones, supra note 21. 
 50 Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation 
and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 877-
78 (2012). In Board of Education v. Dowell, the Supreme Court ruled that desegregation orders 
were intended to be a “temporary measure” and that, in deciding whether to dissolve the or-
ders, courts should consider whether schools “had complied in good faith with the desegrega-
tion degree since it was entered” and “whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable.” Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247, 249-50 
(1991). In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court ruled that courts could withdraw supervision over cer-
tain aspects in which school district has achieved partial unitary status, since “[a] district court 
need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration until a school district 
has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its system.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 
471 (1992). Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court held that desegregation orders must be 
a limited remedy for victims of de jure segregation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 137 
(1995). See Reardon, et al., supra, at 877-78. 
 51 Reardon et al., supra note 50, at 899. 
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districts that were under court ordered supervision were granted unitary 
status.52 
Finally, in the 2007 Parents Involved decision, the Supreme Court 
struck down voluntary racial integration plans in Louisville, Kentucky, 
and Seattle, Washington, on the basis that these school districts lacked a 
compelling interest for using race-based assignments and, further, that al-
ternative race-neutral methods would be effective in achieving each dis-
trict’s integration goals.53 Parents Involved has prevented school districts 
from considering race when implementing voluntary school integration 
plans.54 While Brown I’s monumental decision opened the door for many 
students and families to challenge segregation in their districts, the Su-
preme Court’s subsequent legal precedent has left few options for advo-
cates who are trying to integrate public schools through the federal courts. 
II. SUING IN FEDERAL COURT: A DEAD END FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
EXPERIENCING DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
A. The Process of Federal Desegregation Litigation 
Desegregation litigation in federal district court is an arduous pro-
cess.55 As previously mentioned, federal courts can only order integration 
(or school desegregation) of a school district that once experienced—or 
is experiencing—state-mandated, de jure segregation.56 De jure segrega-
tion is found when “a current condition of segregation result[s] from in-
tentional state action directed specifically to the [allegedly segregated] 
school[].”57 Thus, a plaintiff must prove either that state-mandated inten-
tional segregation is present in the school district or that a state policy 
 
 52 Id. at 878 (discussing data from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which was ob-
tained after reviewing the status of desegregation orders in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Loui-
siana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina). 
 53 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730-31, 
733 (2007) (plurality opinion); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate and Un-
equal: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 633, 635-37 (2014). 
 54 Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 638. 
 55 See generally School Desegregation and Integration: De Jure, UNIV. MO. SCH. LAW, 
https://perma.cc/5ARP-Z4Z7 (last updated May 27, 2016, 9:27 AM) (outlining the process of 
desegregation litigation in federal court and noting key Supreme Court cases in school deseg-
regation jurisprudence). 
 56 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240 (1991) (initiating District Court 
supervision upon finding that “Oklahoma City was operating a ‘dual’ school system – one that 
was intentionally segregated by race.”). 
 57 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 
(1973)). 
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which has led to de facto segregation has a discriminatory intent.58 While 
post-Brown state-mandated segregation is clearly impermissible, it is ex-
tremely challenging for plaintiffs to prove that a policy’s underlying in-
tent is discriminatory.59 If the plaintiff is successful, however, the district 
court will find that the school district unconstitutionally segregates stu-
dents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as per Brown I.60 The district court 
will then issue a desegregation order that requires the school board to im-
plement remedial measures that will desegregate the school district.61 
Usually, the district court gives the school board and other interested par-
ties the opportunity to present a desegregation plan.62 The school district 
can also appeal the decision.63 After the district court issues a final deseg-
regation order, the court then monitors the execution of that order, which 
could include requiring the school board to provide reports about its com-
pliance with the plan or appointing a compliance officer.64 Once a school 
district eliminates all traces of intentional segregation, it will achieve 
“unitary status” and judicial oversight will end.65 
B. The Impact of Desegregation Litigation 
The U.S. Department of Justice has not been forthcoming in provid-
ing up-to-date data on active desegregation orders.66 Further, some federal 
courts are unaware of the number of segregation orders in their dockets 
or are simply releasing districts from judicial oversight, even where seg-
regation continues.67 To this extent, even students that attend school in 
districts that experience de jure segregation face frustrating battles to in-
tegrate their schools. 
 
 58 See Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
387, 437 (2017). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 61 COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., supra note 41, at 1. 
 62 Id. It is unclear how desegregation orders are monitored today. See Hannah-Jones, su-
pra note 21. 
 63 See, e.g., Eliot C. McLaughlin, Mississippi School District Ends Segregation Fight, 
CNN, https://perma.cc/R4MX-SHYD (last updated Mar. 14, 2017, 5:41 PM). 
 64 COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., supra note 41, at 2. 
 65 Id. For example, in order for the New Kent School Board to have achieved unitary 
status as a desegregated school system, the school district needed to demonstrate a good faith 
elimination of all traces of intentional segregation in student assignment, faculty assignment, 
staff assignment, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. See Green v. Cty. 
Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). 
 66 Hannah-Jones, supra note 21. 
 67 Id. 
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As a result of current desegregation jurisprudence, students and par-
ents who initiate new lawsuits against their school districts are unlikely to 
succeed in federal court because it has become increasingly difficult to 
prove intentional discrimination by the state.68 Specifically, this is be-
cause plaintiffs must prove more than a mere discriminatory effect, and 
school boards are able to mask their discriminatory motives.69 “Given its 
illegality, discriminatory intent is seldom, if ever, explicit,” and “nearly 
impossible to prove in practice.”70 This is because, even if a court orders 
a school district to desegregate, it is highly likely that the district will not 
comply or properly oversee desegregation, or will resegregate.71 
Despite the improbability of obtaining relief through federal deseg-
regation litigation, a Brown-era case in Cleveland, Mississippi recently 
reached a hopeful conclusion. In 2017, after the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Mississippi ordered the Cleveland School District 
to desegregate its school system, the school district voted to end its ap-
peal.72 Instead, the court accepted the parties’ proposal: to combine the 
two segregated high schools in the district into one integrated school.73 
The case had been active since 1969, when a judge initially ordered the 
Cleveland School District to desegregate, but the district had failed in its 
attempts to follow the court’s order.74 The newly integrated Cleveland 
Central High School opened its doors in the fall of 2017.75 
 
 68 Eric S. Stein, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003, 2004 
(1990). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Darby & Levy, supra note 58, at 437. “We emphasize that the differentiating factor 
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to seg-
regate.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973); see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717, 755 (1974); Why Is This Happening? with Chris Hayes: Investigating School Seg-
regation with Nikole Hannah-Jones, NBC (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/XDU3-FVLV 
(discussing the rise of de facto segregation despite the fact that racially restrictive covenants 
and mandated segregation have been outlawed). 
 71 See Stancil, supra note 8. 
 72 McLaughlin, supra note 63; see Cowan v. Bolivar Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV-
00031-DMB, 2017 WL 988411 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2017). 
 73 Cowan, 2017 WL 988411, at *1-2 (“Under this agreement, the District will consolidate 
its ninth through twelfth grade students into a single comprehensive high school housed in the 
current facilities at Cleveland High School and Margaret Green Junior High School.”); Edwin 
Rios, A Mississippi Town Finally Desegregated Its Schools, 60 Years Later, MOTHER JONES, 
Nov.-Dec. 2017, https://perma.cc/7M88-RJ98. 
 74 “In 1989, a court ordered the Cleveland school district to bus students between the two 
high schools for shared classes.” Rios, supra note 73. In 2011, the Justice Department found 
that the district “failed to make good faith efforts to eliminate the vestiges of its former dual 
school system.” Id. In 2013, a court ordered the Cleveland school district to allow students to 
enroll in whichever school they wanted. Id. 
 75 Kelsey Davis & Aallyah Wright, Cleveland Central High Opens New Era for School 
District, MISSISSIPI TODAY (Aug. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/SZ8X-795B. 
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The outcome of the Cleveland litigation is a best-case scenario for 
challenging ongoing school segregation that is a result of prior de jure 
segregation. To challenge de facto segregation, however, creative litiga-
tion strategies are required. In places like New York City, one litigation 
option is to address school funding schemes that lead to unequal distribu-
tion of resources between predominantly Black and Latinx schools and 
those of their white peers, in what is dubbed “school finance litigation.” 
Another option is to ask courts to “read in” anti-segregation language into 
the New York State constitution, a strategy that has been successful in 
other states. And finally, as this Note argues, advocates can use the local 
Human Rights Law as a tool to address inequality that is a symptom of 
school segregation. 
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS: SUCCESS REMAINS 
TO BE SEEN 
For decades, state finance litigation has been an attractive strategy 
for plaintiffs fighting de facto segregation, including plaintiffs who bring 
claims in state courts.76 Plaintiffs have used school finance litigation to 
challenge funding schemes of school districts with predominantly stu-
dents of color, who are provided with fewer resources than students of 
predominantly white schools.77 The premise of state financial litigation is 
that unequal or inadequate school funding violates both the equal protec-
tion and the education clauses of a state’s constitution.78 Originally, liti-
gants sought equalized funding for school districts under state constitu-
tions; however, their losses outnumbered their successes.79 As a result, 
litigants then shifted “their focus from equitable funding to inadequate 
funding.”80 
A. Connecticut: The Slow Aftermath of Sheff 
A line of cases arising out of Hartford, Connecticut, illustrates the 
successful use of state finance litigation to address unequal funding 
schemes. In 1977, in Horton v. Meskill, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
 
 76 See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252-53 (1999). 
 77 See id. at 253. 
 78 James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1223, 1229 (2008). For more information about state finance litigation in states across the 
United States, see School Finance Litigation, by Year, Case, and Status, by State: 1970-2009, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/edfin/litigation.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 
2019). 
 79 Ryan, supra note 78. 
 80 Id. 
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held that unequal school financing violates a student’s right to “a substan-
tially equal educational opportunity,” as required by the education clause 
of the Connecticut State Constitution.81 In 1996, in Sheff v. O’Neill, the 
same court expanded on the Horton decision and declared that de facto 
school segregation in Hartford public schools violated Connecticut’s con-
stitutional mandate to provide the city’s children with a “substantially 
equal” education.82 The court read two clauses of the Connecticut Consti-
tution together: “the education clause, which guarantees ‘free public ele-
mentary and secondary schools in the state’ and the segregation clause, 
which guarantees that no person shall ‘be subjected to segregation or dis-
crimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil rights because 
of . . . race [or] ancestry.’”83 The Court found that Connecticut’s segrega-
tion clause informed the state’s education clause.84 As such, “the exist-
ence of racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system deprive[d] 
school children of a substantially equal educational opportunity” and vi-
olated the state’s constitution.85 The court then ordered the Connecticut 
legislature to take remedial measures and to develop a plan to address 
segregation in Hartford public schools.86 
Despite this monumental decision, only eleven percent of Hartford 
students attended integrated schools during the 2007–2008 school year.87 
Advocates on behalf of the plaintiffs in Sheff returned to court in an at-
tempt to hold the state and the city accountable.88 In 2015, Connecticut 
settled with the plaintiffs to add more seats in suburban school districts 
 
 81 Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977). 
 82 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280-86 (Conn. 1996) (“We therefore hold that, tex-
tually, [the education clause] . . . requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to 
remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred 
de jure or de facto . . . . In summary, under our law, which imposes an affirmative constitu-
tional obligation on the legislature to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity for 
all public schoolchildren, the state action doctrine is not a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims of 
constitutional deprivation.”); see also Ryan, supra note 30, at 530. 
 83 Ryan, supra note 30, at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270 
n.1, n.2). 
 84 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1283; Ryan, supra note 30, at 530. 
 85 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281, 1281-83; Ryan, supra note 30, at 530. 
 86 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290. 
 87 An integrated school is one where “less than three-quarters of a school’s student pop-
ulation are minorities.” Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Nearly Half the Students from Hartford Now 
Attend Integrated Schools, CT MIRROR (Nov. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/B447-2S9A. 
 88 See Denisa R. Superville, New Settlement Reached in Hartford, Conn., Desegregation 
Case, EDUC. WEEK: DISTRICT DOSSIER (Feb. 27, 2015, 5:05 PM), https://perma.cc/XK3P-
G238. 
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for inner-city students and to work towards having fifty percent of Hart-
ford students in magnet schools.89 Twenty-two years after Sheff’s original 
ruling, Hartford is still not fully integrated, but substantial improvement 
has been made. By the fall of 2016, forty-nine percent of Hartford minor-
ity students attended integrated schools.90 Hartford now faces, however, 
a common problem that school systems across the country are facing since 
Brown I: white parents are not convinced that it is in their children’s best 
interests to attend integrated magnet schools outside of their neighbor-
hoods or their zones.91 In 2017, 45.6% of Hartford minority students at-
tended integrated schools, a drop from 49% in 2016 and below the recent 
settlement-mandated percentage of 47.5%.92 
B. New York: Still Waiting for Funds 
Similar to the strategy used by the plaintiffs in Sheff, school finance 
litigation has been used to address school inequity in New York as well. 
The Education Article of the New York State Constitution provides that 
“the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system 
of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be ed-
ucated.”93 In the 1982 Levittown decision, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the State’s highest court, interpreted New York State’s Education 
Article to entitle students to a “sound basic education.”94 
Subsequently, in 1993, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity (“CFE”), an 
interest group comprised of parents,95 filed a lawsuit against the state al-
leging that the “State’s educational financing scheme fail[ed] to provide 
 
 89 Id. A system of magnet schools, which parents could voluntarily opt their children into, 
was the method that Hartford employed to desegregate its schools. Carmen Baskauf & Lucy 
Nalpathanchil, With Sheff Back in Court, A Look at School Integration in Hartford, CONN. 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/GB8V-MVBB. This method has been recog-
nized as a model for integration across the country, yet the Hartford district still faces its own 
challenges to achieve integration. Id. For more information about magnet schools, see Ali 
Trachta, Charter Schools vs. Magnet Schools, NICHE, https://perma.cc/7VPJ-PX66 (last vis-
ited May 2, 2019). 
 90 Kathleen Megan & Matthew Kauffman, Under New Rules, State Says More Hartford 
Students Attend Integrated Schools, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 1, 2016, 5:46 PM), 
https://perma.cc/P7HR-L38A. 
 91 This American Life: The Problem We All Live With - Part Two, CHI. PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 
7, 2015), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/563/the-problem-we-all-live-with-part-two 
[https://perma.cc/98WU-ZWVU]. 
 92 Matthew Kauffman, Number of Hartford Students in Integrated Schools Drops by Hun-
dreds, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://perma.cc/KF35-GKF5. 
 93 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 94 Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48 (1982). 
 95 A group of parents formed an interest group called the Campaign for Fiscal Equity 
(“CFE”) and filed a lawsuit alleging that their children were not being provided access to an 
adequate education. CFE no longer exists as a non-profit. The Alliance for Quality Education 
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public school students in the City of New York . . . [with] an opportunity 
to obtain a sound basic education as required by the State Constitution.”96 
The State filed a motion to dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of 
action, and the New York Court of Appeals eventually denied the motion, 
holding that the plaintiffs did have a viable cause of action under the Ed-
ucation Clause.97 Affirming the underlying principles of Levittown, the 
court clearly stated that “a system which failed to provide for a sound 
basic education would violate the Education Article.”98 The court articu-
lated that a “sound basic education” “should consist of the basic literacy, 
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually 
function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving 
on a jury” and “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms.”99 
The court concluded that, to prove their case, plaintiffs must establish “a 
causal link between the present funding system and any proven failure to 
provide a sound basic education to New York City school children.”100 
After years of preparing for trial and organizing with community 
groups, the trial court found that the State’s method for funding education 
in NYC violated students’ rights under the State Education Article.101 
However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, articulating fur-
ther that the Education Article only mandates an opportunity to receive 
the “skills necessary to obtain employment, and to competently discharge 
one’s civic responsibilities”102 and that the facilities and resources in 
NYC’s public schools were not “so inadequate as to deprive students of 
the opportunity to acquire the skills that constitute a sound basic educa-
tion.”103 Further, the Appellate Division determined that the State is not 
responsible for the demographic factors facing certain students, such as 
“poverty, high crime neighborhoods, single parent or dysfunctional 
homes, homes where English is not spoken, or homes where parents offer 
 
was created in 2000 to provide support for CFE and continues to work for educational equity 
in New York state. Equity, ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., https://perma.cc/PP4F-3YF2 (last 
visited May 2, 2019). 
 96 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 314 (1995) (CFE I). 
 97 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 295 A.D.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
2002) (discussing CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995)). In denying the state’s motion to dismiss, the 
New York Court of Appeals established a framework for the trial court to determine whether 
the state was providing NYC public school students with a sound basic education. Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 187 Misc. 1, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001). 
 98 CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d at 316. 
 99 Id. at 316, 317. 
 100 Id. at 318. 
 101 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, No. 111070/93, 2001 WL 35912269 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. January 31, 2001) (per curiam); ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note 
95. 
 102 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 295 A.D.2d 1, 8 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002). 
 103 Id. at 11. 
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little help with homework and motivation.”104 Ultimately, the court stated 
that this was because the appropriate “cure lies in eliminating the socio-
economic conditions facing certain students.”105 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed this decision in 2003, 
holding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a causal link between the 
state’s current funding system and its failure to provide NYC school chil-
dren with “better teachers, facilities, and instrumentalities of learning.”106 
The court noted: 
Plaintiffs have prevailed here owing to a unique combination of 
circumstances: New York City schools have the most student 
need in the state and the highest local costs yet receive some of 
the lowest per-student funding and have some of the worst results. 
Plaintiffs in other districts who cannot demonstrate a similar com-
bination may find tougher going in the courts.107 
As a result, the court directed the Legislature and the Governor to 
articulate a funding scheme as a way to reform the education funding sys-
tem in NYC.108 In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals accepted the 
state’s minimum funding amount recommendation as reasonable,109 
which the State still owes today.110  
The CFE line of cases demonstrate that, even when plaintiffs suc-
cessfully prove a causal link between a lack of funding for schools and 
students’ access to the constitutionally-mandated level of education, this 
is still not enough to ensure educational equality in NYC. 
 
 104 Id. at 16. The Appellate Division relied on the plaintiffs’ expert, who “conceded that 
investing money ‘in the family’ rather than the schools ‘might pay off even more.” Id. 
 105 Id. For more information about how socio-economic status of students is linked to 
school funding, see MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTEN BLAGG, DO POOR KIDS GET THEIR FAIR 
SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING? (2017), https://perma.cc/89SP-EHJV. 
 106 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 919 (2003) (CFE II). The 
trial court concluded that, for example, that teacher certification rates “are too low” in NYC, 
based on evidence that established a correlation between teacher certification and increased 
student performance. Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 187 Misc. 2d 1, 26-
27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001)). 
 107 Id. at 932 (emphasis in original). 
 108 Id. at 930, 958; ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note 95. Between 2004 and 2006, 
the state failed to establish a minimum funding amount per the court’s order. Then, the trial 
court appointed a Panel of Judicial Referees to make recommendations to the court, the State’s 
Governor appealed that decision, and the Appellate Division ordered the state to comply. 
ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note 95. 
 109 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 19-20 (2006). 
 110 Joint Legislative Hearing on the Executive Proposal 2018-2019, Testimony by Alliance 
for Quality Education (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/3NAG-6UHU. 
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IV. A STRATEGY IN STATE COURT: INTEGRATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATE 
State finance litigation, as it pertains to challenging unequal re-
sources, has largely fallen out of use because success in court has not 
translated to the full integration of school districts. In many states, includ-
ing New York, advocates have tried to persuade state courts that integra-
tion is a mandate required by their respective state constitutions. 
A. Minnesota: A New Attempt 
Advocates in Minnesota are trying a new strategy that frames segre-
gation not only as an issue of unequal resources but also as an issue that 
violates the state constitution itself.111 In 2016, seven parents and guardi-
ans filed a lawsuit against the State of Minnesota in Hennepin County 
District Court, claiming that state officials violated the Education Clause 
of the Minnesota Constitution by denying them an “adequate education” 
and enabling a segregated education.112 The plaintiffs argued that, under 
the seminal Minnesota state case Skeen v. State, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota had interpreted its education clause to mean that schools must 
meet “baseline level of adequacy and uniformity” of education, and that 
a separate but equal education system does not meet that requirement.113 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ case on the 
grounds that it was not justiciable (able to be litigated) because it is the 
state legislature’s responsibility to establish “qualitative educational 
standards,” not the judiciary’s.114 
In January 2018, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
on the issue of justiciability.115 The plaintiffs argued that the judiciary has 
the power to determine whether the legislature violated its constitutional 
obligation under Minnesota’s Education Clause, and the court concluded 
that the plaintiffs’ claims could be litigated.116 The plaintiffs’ supporters 
believe that a victory in this case could be used as persuasive precedent 
to support efforts to make school segregation an issue under other state 
 
 111 Brandie Burris-Gallagher, The Court’s Role in Education: Why the Cruz-Guzman Law-
suit Is a Big Deal, EDALLIES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/QXQ8-C5VJ. 
 112 Appellants’ Brief at 3, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) 
(No. A16-1265), 2016 WL 10894525. 
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N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1265), 2017 WL 7550718; see also Skeen v. 
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993). 
 114 Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 541; see also Burris-Gallagher, supra note 111. 
 115 Burris-Gallagher, supra note 111. 
 116 Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2018). 
322 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2 
constitutions throughout the United States.117 However, charter school in-
terest groups, who support the State of Minnesota in this case, claim that 
state constitutional protections against school segregation would impede 
on parents’ rights to school choice.118 This same argument could be made 
in NYC, where research shows that, while segregation was caused by red-
lining and housing discrimination, school choice has exacerbated the 
problem.119 Advocates for integration in New York, however, face a sim-
ilar obstacle as those in Minnesota: convincing the New York Court of 
Appeals that segregation violates the New York State Constitution. 
B. New York: A Weak Education Article 
Advocates in New York have taken the fight against school segrega-
tion to the New York Court of Appeals under the State’s Education 
Clause.120 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has effectively pre-
vented advocates from using the Education Clause to remedy school seg-
regation by articulating a low standard of quality education that a school 
system must provide to its students.121 
To fulfill its constitutional obligation and provide a sound basic ed-
ucation, the state must provide certain educational “inputs” to ensure that 
required student “outputs” are met.122 In other words, the state must pro-
vide “the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources . . . to 
provide students with the opportunity to obtain these essential skills” and 
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2016), https://perma.cc/UCY9-9HR9; Dana Goldstein, How Do You Get Better Schools? Take 
the State to Court, More Advocates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.
cc/7M2W-AD6N. 
 118 Cohen, supra note 117; Goldstein, supra note 117. 
 119 While the term “school choice” may seem like it has nothing to do with the government 
action, policy decisions have allowed charter schools to flourish and parents to flee their zoned 
schools, which leaves poor, underperforming, and segregated schools in their wake. See 
NICOLE MADER ET AL., THE NEW SCH., CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: 
HOW SCHOOL CHOICE DIVIDES N.Y.C. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 4 (May 2018), https://
perma.cc/B2FK-G3ET; Elizabeth A. Harris, First Test for New York Chancellor: A Middle 
School Desegregation Plan, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6F3Y-ZJWF; Kate 
Taylor, A Manhattan District Where School Choice Amounts to Segregation, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/U3MD-75CG. 
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v. New York, 100 N.Y.2d 434 (2003). 
 121 See generally NYCLU, 4 N.Y.3d 175; Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d 434. 
 122 Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d at 440 (“[T]he State fails to provide [students] a sound basic ed-
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achievements, as required by the New York State Constitution.123 Thus, 
to succeed, plaintiffs must clearly demonstrate that there is a causal con-
nection between the deficient state input and subsequent deficient student 
output.124 While the strength of that link is difficult to measure, it can be 
proven through evidence demonstrating how poor facilities, overcrowded 
school buildings, and outdated curriculums lead to low graduation rates 
and test scores.125 
After the New York Court of Appeals mandated the state to establish 
a minimum funding amount for NYC Public Schools in 2003,126 advo-
cates tried to use the Education Article to address inequitable funding and 
school segregation in other parts of the State outside of New York City. 
Two New York Court of Appeals cases, Paynter v. State of New York and 
New York Civil Liberties Union v. State of New York, demonstrate that the 
Education Article fails to protect students against school segregation in 
New York, including New York City.127 Further, these cases demonstrate 
how the New York Court of Appeals has limited the scope of its remedy 
in Campaign for Fiscal Equity. 
The New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), representing the 
plaintiffs, sought to extend the rulings of Campaign for Fiscal Equity and 
alleged “that students in 27 named schools outside of New York City 
[were] being denied the opportunity for a sound basic education.”128 Since 
the New York Court of Appeals had mandated a funding scheme to make 
up for inequities in the NYC public schools in the Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity cases, NYCLU maintained that the State must put in place correc-
tive measures to address “impoverished education in schools outside of 
New York City.”129 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, stating 
that the “New York Constitution does not require equality in educational 
offerings throughout the state.”130 The Constitution does, however, re-
quire the state to meet the minimum standards of educational quality.131 
In doing so, the court emphasized that local governments should maintain 
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control over their local school districts and limited how retroactive fund-
ing could be provided to remedy inadequate resources in individual public 
schools across the state.132 
In Paynter v. New York, fifteen students in the Rochester City School 
District alleged that racial and socioeconomic segregation—by the State’s 
action or inaction—deprived them of a sound basic education under the 
New York State Constitution.133 The case never went to trial, as the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the State’s motion to dismiss the 
claim.134 The plaintiffs did not claim that the State provided deficient 
“teaching, facilities, or instrumentalities of learning.”135 Rather, they ar-
gued that the State’s practices and policies resulted in a segregated demo-
graphic composition of the schools, which led to “some of the lowest test 
scores and graduation rates in the state.”136 The court stated that proof of 
“academic failure” alone, without proof that the State had failed in their 
duty under the New York State Constitution, does not rise to a cause of 
action under the Education Article.137 Further, the court articulated that 
New York State has no constitutional responsibility to change the de-
mographics of school districts with high concentrations of poverty and 
racial isolation in order to improve academic performance.138 This hold-
ing reinforces the notion that if the state merely provides “adequate re-
sources,” it “satisfies its constitutional promise under the Education Arti-
cle, even though student performance remains substandard,” segregated 
student body notwithstanding.139 
Paynter and NYCLU reveal that the Education Article provides a lim-
ited avenue for students and their families to address persistent inequities 
in school systems across the state. The New York Court of Appeals re-
mains hesitant to expand the holdings of the CFE cases to address ine-
quality that is unrelated to school funding outside of the NYCs public 
schools. Further, the court refuses to apply the Education Article in such 
a way that could remedy the segregation that exists in NYC and through-
out the state. In effect, the New York Court of Appeals has essentially 
closed off the state constitution as a way for students and parents in seg-
regated school districts to seek relief throughout the state. And, while 
NYC public schools have achieved some success and received a judgment 
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establishing a minimum funding scheme to provide students with an ade-
quate education, the system remains deeply segregated. 
V. A CREATIVE LITIGATION FRONTIER: THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
A. Background on Litigation Under the NYCHRL 
Because the New York Court of Appeals held that segregated 
schools do not violate the Education Article in Paynter, advocates are, 
and should be, looking for other ways to seek relief. The New York City 
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) may be a promising tool for advocates 
to use in challenging aspects of educational inequity that are facets of 
school segregation, such as discrimination based on race, color, or na-
tional origin in public accommodations.140 
The NYCHRL was created in 1965 after incorporating two local 
laws: Local Law 80, which banned discrimination in private housing, and 
Local Law 55, which created the Commission on Intergroup Relations.141 
The NYC Commission on Human Rights is the administrative body 
charged with enforcing the NYCHRL and educating the public about the 
law.142 Today, the Human Rights Law is “one of the most comprehensive 
civil rights laws in the nation” and “prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations”143 based on “race, color, re-
ligion/creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender 
(including sexual harassment), gender identity, sexual orientation, disa-
bility, pregnancy, marital status, and partnership status.”144 Since its in-
ception, the NYCHRL has protected New Yorkers against discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, age, and national origin, while the other classes 
were added later over time.145 The NYCHRL has generally been used to 
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combat discriminatory practices by employers, such as retaliation and 
harassment, to offer “additional protections in housing,” and to protect 
against “bias-based profiling by law enforcement.”146 
Until recently, state and federal courts in New York have not taken 
litigation under the NYCHRL seriously. Specifically, state and federal 
courts previously declined to develop a unique legal standard under the 
NYCHRL.147 If courts did engage in an analysis of the NYCHRL, judges 
chose to follow “rote parallelism”148 because the courts viewed the 
NYCHRL as a carbon copy of its corresponding state and federal law, 
instead of liberally construing the NYCHRL to reach its potential in 
providing New Yorkers with more protection against various forms of 
discrimination.149 Federal law even supports liberal construction of local 
law. For example, Title VII, the federal counterpart to the NYCHRL, 
states that nothing in the law exempts a person from liability under any 
present or future local law.150 
Recognizing this problem, the NYC Council passed the Local Civil 
Rights Restoration Act in 2005 to combat this prevailing practice in the 
judiciary.151 The NYC Council envisioned that the NYCHRL would be 
the ceiling of protection and not the floor, as state and federal laws are 
treated.152 Therefore, the Restoration Act mandates that “the provisions 
of [the NYCHRL] are to be construed independently from similar or iden-
tical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”153 In this way, the 
NYCHRL is intended to “meld the broadest vision of social justice with 
the strongest law enforcement deterrent” and to protect the rights of all 
people to be free from discrimination, in a way that the federal civil rights 
law and state human rights law have not been able to accomplish.154 
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The power of the NYCHRL has come to fruition in employment dis-
crimination and sexual harassment cases.155 In these contexts, both state 
and federal courts have acknowledged that the NYCHRL requires a dif-
ferent analysis than the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) 
and Title VII.156 For example, under the NYSHRL and Title VII, plaintiffs 
must prove that the harassment or discrimination is either severe or per-
vasive.157 However, under the NYCHRL, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
only that they were treated less well than other employees based on a pro-
tected class.158 In cases involving discrimination based on race, if a de-
fendant has put forth “one or more nondiscriminatory motivations for its 
actions,”159 a plaintiff must respond “with some evidence that at least one 
of the reasons proffered . . . is false, misleading, or incomplete.”160 In ad-
dition, in some jurisdictions, employers can successfully assert a defense 
under NYSHRL and Title VII by demonstrating that they maintain anti-
harassment policies and reporting avenues and promptly address com-
plaints.161 However, employers are strictly liable for harassment by man-
agers and supervisors under the NYCHRL.162 Overall, the NYCHRL pro-
vides greater protections to plaintiffs than its state or federal 
counterparts.163 Since neither federal equal protection laws nor the federal 
or state constitutions have proven useful in protecting against segregation, 
the Human Rights Law is a promising new frontier for NYC advocates to 
use in desegregation litigation. 
B. Litigation Against School Inequity Under the NYCHRL 
In the realm of education discrimination, school equity advocates 
have not used the NYCHRL as an avenue to combat school segregation 
in the same way as it has been used to seek relief from workplace discrim-
ination and harassment. To that end, school equity advocates have little 
jurisprudence to draw from to craft their positions under the NYCHRL. 
Broadly, however, the NYCHRL protects individuals from discrimination 
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in the area of public accommodations.164 Since public schools are public 
accommodations, the NYC public school system must meet, and is sub-
ject to, the requirements of this law.165 
Despite the lack of jurisprudence, advocates have started to explore 
using the NYCHRL to combat educational discrimination in NYC public 
schools. In 2018, four Black and Latinx public high school students, on 
behalf of a class of all Black and Latinx students who attend segregated 
NYC schools, and IntegrateNYC, a student-led advocacy organization, 
filed L.P. v. New York City Department of Education, a lawsuit against 
the NYC Department of Education (“DOE”), the Public Schools Athletic 
League (“PSAL”),166 and PSAL’s Executive Director, Donald J. Douglas, 
as defendants.167 The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Lawyers 
for the Public Interest (“NYLPI”), argued that the defendants violated the 
NYCHRL by maintaining “discriminatory policies that deny Black and 
Latin[x] students equal access to the life-changing possibilities of 
sports,”168 which negatively impacts their physical health, mental health, 
teamwork skills, community ties, and friendships, and negatively influ-
ences their college opportunities.169 While this lawsuit is not particularly 
addressing school segregation at large, it addresses a facet of school ine-
quality—sports access—that disproportionately affects students of color 
in NYC public schools.170 
Importantly, the students brought the case against the defendants as 
providers and managers of NYC public school accommodations.171 The 
students claimed that, as managers, the defendants withheld and denied 
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their rightful access to “accommodations, facilities, advantages, and priv-
ileges related to sports teams on account of [their] race” and promulgated 
and maintained “practices that result in a disparate impact [based upon 
race] to the detriment of the [students].”172 The students demonstrated 
their claims with evidence of the disproportionate lack of access to sports 
teams for Black and Latinx students, and the disparate impact on them 
resulting from policies that benefit schools with established sports 
teams.173 These policies include “‘grandfathering’ established teams,” 
which favors established schools with fewer Black and Latinx students, 
“maintaining an opaque and discretionary team-granting system” which 
leads to a lower grant rate of sports teams in schools with higher propor-
tions of Black and Latinx students, and “preventing students from partic-
ipating on PSAL teams outside the school where they are enrolled.”174 
This lawsuit was filed after years of legislative and grassroots advo-
cacy from students and teachers impacted by the lack of access to sports 
teams. Over two decades ago, NYC began dismantling many large, un-
derperforming high schools to create smaller high schools,175 with the 
idea that smaller educational settings would foster better academic rela-
tionships between students and their teachers and increase graduation 
rates.176 These schools, however, were primarily comprised of people of 
color and immigrant students and, thus, these same populations now com-
prise the newer, smaller schools as well.177 PSAL did not adapt their pol-
icies to permit creating and maintaining sports teams at these smaller 
schools.178 Thus, “[t]he schools with the least access to sports teams ‘have 
the highest numbers of students of color, or for whom English is not their 
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first language.’”179 As a result, students of color in these smaller schools 
who wanted to play on particular sports teams suffered.180 
In 2011, David Garcia-Rosen, a teacher and an activist, other school 
administrators, and high school students in the Bronx created the Small 
Schools Athletic League to provide these students with access to sports 
teams, with virtually no support from the Education Department or 
PSAL.181 Unfortunately, this proposal did not steadily increase access to 
sports teams, since students in predominantly Black and Latinx schools 
across the city still did not have equal access to sports teams.182 The Fair 
Play Coalition, a collection of students, teachers, coaches, and lawyers, 
are using the lawsuit to expand access to school sports across NYC and 
guarantee that all students have an opportunity to play a sport that PSAL 
offers students.183 
The students in L.P. are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against defendants, yet also offer as solutions alternative policies that the 
defendants should implement for less discriminatory outcomes, such as 
“mandat[ing] that every small New York City high school be considered 
part of an ‘umbrella program’ with co-located or nearby schools” such 
that each group would have the same number of students.184 PSAL, then, 
“could grant each program an equal number of PSAL teams,” to ensure 
that all NYC public high school students have an equal opportunity to 
access sports teams.185 The defendants have responded and denied the 
claims.186 
In 2019, the NYC Department of Education unveiled a pilot program 
entitled “PSAL-All Access.”187 Twenty-six schools from Manhattan, the 
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Bronx, and Brooklyn that enroll 8,500 students will have access to nine-
teen PSAL sports teams.188 The program will also permit students from 
these participating schools to join sports teams at nearby schools if their 
respective school does not provide a certain sports team.189 However, 
Melissa Iachan, Senior Staff Attorney at NYLPI and a lead lawyer in L.P., 
stated that the program “is too small to make a dent in the issue” before 
the court, as “the pilot program does not change the pervasive systematic 
racial inequality in the current PSAL system.”190 
At this point, the parties have entered a settlement negotiation agree-
ment and the court has granted the plaintiffs an extension to move for 
class certification.191 It is conceivable that the students could be success-
ful if the New York Supreme Court of Bronx County views that they are 
treated “less well” than their white student counterparts—who have ac-
cess to PSAL sports teams—because of their race and ethnicity, taking 
the NYCHRL to the “furthest reaches of what is constitutionally permis-
sible.”192 In this case, the court will have to ensure that NYC public 
schools are no longer separate and unequal, but have equal sports re-
sources, taking a step towards integration. 
The lawsuit against the DOE and PSAL under the NYCHRL is an 
example of litigation advocacy that looks beyond federal and state law 
and takes advantage of a local law that could finally safeguard plaintiffs 
against a form of discrimination that they would not originally be pro-
tected from—school segregation. This lawsuit advises advocates to strate-
gize and challenge individual aspects of educational inequity, whether it 
be access to sports teams, extracurricular activities, or after-school pro-
grams. 
VI. BEYOND LITIGATION 
Underlying any litigation effort must be a desire to truly serve the 
needs of communities affected by educational inequity. Brown I made 
school segregation a national issue after the LDF constructed a decades-
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Stipulation and Order at 1, L.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 155825/2018 (May 16, 
2019). Additionally, ongoing organizing efforts have led to the passage of Res. No. 85-B, a 
City Council bill that will require PSAL to make public its “policies, procedures, resource-
allocation and decision-making criteria,” an issue that is addressed in the NYCHRL litigation. 
Press Release, N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Interest, Public High School Students at City Hall 
to Celebrate Unanimous Passage of Sports Equity Legislation (May 29, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/KL3D-TB7J; Res. No. 85-B, 2019 N.Y.C. Council Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
 192 Gurian, supra note 147, at 262. 
332 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2 
long strategy to combat racial discrimination in education.193 In NYC, 
grassroots organizing around integrating schools has been a long-standing 
tradition that is in full force today.194 Unlike pre-Brown efforts, however, 
it is incumbent on attorneys to work with the specific communities im-
pacted by school segregation and not to solely litigate on behalf of mar-
ginalized groups.195 
One way to practice this type of lawyering is to follow the advocacy 
that led to the NYLPI’s complaint against the DOE and PSAL. Advocates, 
including students and teachers from segregated schools in NYC, orga-
nized for years before the complaint was even filed.196 After addressing 
the lack of sports access through organizing, the complaint was filed in 
continuation of the ongoing fight. Thus, litigation stemmed from the or-
ganizing, and in turn was tailored to address only a portion of school in-
equity that results from school segregation. In this way, a suggested strat-
egy could be to fight inequalities piece by piece, while confronting the 
whole systemic problem of racial segregation in NYC public schools. 
A recommendation for future litigation is to address the high rates of 
school suspensions that impact Black and Latinx students. Advocates are 
currently organizing to reduce the maximum number of days that students 
can be suspended from school.197 A potential claim under the NYCHRL 
could be that the disproportionate rate at which Black and Latinx students 
are suspended in NYC public schools, as compared to other races, results 
in disparate impact on those students.198 Advocates may have additional 
leverage with this argument because, as of 2011, the DOE must report 
discipline and suspension data to the NYC Council as mandated by the 
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NYCHRL.199 In sum, lawyers must work in conjunction with communi-
ties impacted by racial segregation in school to determine the best course 
of action to fit their needs. 
CONCLUSION 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown I, Ella Baker, an or-
ganizer and civil rights leader, expressed her frustration with the general 
ignorance surrounding school segregation in New York.200 With the 
NAACP’s focus on remedying segregation in the South, she commented, 
“[W]hat do you do about the poor children right here?”201 Students, par-
ents, and advocates are still asking that same question today and, like 
Baker, are actively trying to remedy school segregation in NYC. Educa-
tional inequity, as a function of school segregation, is a persistent problem 
in NYC that is gaining political traction but is long overdue to be readily 
fixed. 
It goes without saying that all children in NYC, regardless of race, 
should be provided access to an excellent education. As one option, ad-
vocates should creatively initiate litigation that challenges facets of une-
qual school systems under the NYCHRL. But, it is important to 
acknowledge that this tactic will not solve education inequality, as there 
is no single solution to this problem. To ensure that all children in NYC 
receive the education that they deserve, advocates must: challenge fund-
ing schemes, access to sports and after-school programs, and distributions 
based on race, gender, and test scores across the city; understand the effect 
that white supremacy has had on keeping our schools separate and une-
qual; and listen to the realities of NYC public school students and follow 
their lead.202 
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